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In the year 1208, Francis of Assisi and his band of followers could look up into 
the sky at twilight and marvel at the fact that as God was putting away the sun 
into its place of rest under the sea while his angels were, at the same time, 
lighting distant bonfires as beacons whereby night travelers and sailors could 
steer their course.  In the eyes of Francis and his contemporaries, “brother sun” 
and “sister moon” were continually being assigned their rightful places by a 
host of spiritual beings who served man’s interests humbly, faithfully, and 
without reward.  This was the spiritual lesson Francis learned from his 
astronomical observations. 
In our own day, the vision of Francis is reserved to a small minority of simple 
souls and poets.  Modern astronomy, armed with the Newtonian laws of 
gravitation looks up into the evening sky and senses that the massive satellite 
that we call “earth” is turning its face away from our local star that we have 
traditionally called “our sun.”  As the ambient light decreases, the iris of every 
animal and human eye gradually enlarges to admit more light and to take 
notice that the cold and impersonal cosmic void surrounding our earth-satellite 
is littered with billions of massive stars that have been randomly flung into their 
respective places by a Big Bang that erupted ten billion years ago.  Each of 
these massive fireballs in the night sky are in various phases of being born, 
maturing, or dying out—all according to the impersonal laws of nuclear physics 
and celestial mechanics.  As in the case of our own star, not a single one of 
them ever gives a fleeting nod to the prayers of our saints or to the telemetric 
data being gathered by our space probes.  The lesson learned from these 
observations is that we are utterly alone in a universe that takes no notice of 
whether we laugh or cry, get sick or die. 
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In the year 1208, Francis of Assisi could raise his eyes upward and imagine 
Jesus ascended into heaven and sitting at the right hand of the Father.  On the 
last day, when the stars fall from heaven and the light of the sun goes out, 
Francis anticipates that this Jesus will have his Second Coming to earth to 
rescue the righteous and to bring them up with him into their heavenly reward.   
In our own day, the vision of Francis is reserved to a small minority of simple 
souls and poets.  Even if Jesus did rise up into the heavens (as Acts 1:9 claims), 
a reflective scientist can calculate that, given his forward momentum, he might, 
after two thousand years, be just now reaching the outer limits of our solar 
system.   His body, of course, has long been completely dehydrated and his 
flesh1 has been burned beyond recognition.  He had, you see, no climatized 
space suit to protect his fragile skin as he rose into the thin air of our 
atmosphere.  Likewise, there never was nor ever will be any loving arms to 
receive him at the end of his space flight.   
I begin my examination of Polanyi with a stark reminder of just how massively 
the emergence of modern science has challenged the Christian worldview of an 
earlier era.  Polanyi, needless to say, was himself sympathetic to the Christian 
worldview at the same time that he was a hard-headed practicing scientist.  
Vigorous debates have arisen within the Polanyi Society as to (a) how Polanyi 
viewed the ontological status of “God” and (b) how the quest for truth within 
religion coincided with and differed from the pursuit of truth in science.   In the 
past, I tried to show how Richard Gelwick and Elizabeth Sewell found 
encouragement for their faith in and adherence to Christianity from Polanyi 
while, at the same time, Marjorie Grene and Harry Prosch found further support 
for their faith in and adherence to agnosticism. 
My purpose today is to examine the final section of PK.  In these chapters, 
Polanyi dismisses the notion that the “evolutionary achievement” (385) that 
culminates in the consciousness and responsible personhood exercised by 
humans could be accounted for in terms of random mutations and survival of 
1 Not even Jesus’ soul survives, since the notion of an eternal soul is merely an 
empty Neoplatonic myth that got carried over into medieval Christianity.  Even 
biblical scholars recognize today that Jesus and his Galilean band of followers 
had no idea whatsoever that they had or needed an “eternal soul” to insure that 
they could or would enter into everlasting life. 
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the fittest.  Just as Polanyi fiercely opposed the inadequacy of objectivism to 
account for progress in science; in parallel fashion, he objected to the 
inadequacy of neo-Darwinism to account for progress in biological evolution.  
On the constructive side, Polanyi suggests that morphogenetic fields guiding 
embryonic development and philogenetic fields guiding evolutionary 
development find their parallels in the heuristic fields guiding the advancement 
of knowledge.  In his closing words of PK, Polanyi envisions these fields as spin-
offs of a universal “cosmic field” that harmonizes with what Christians mean 
“when worshipping God” (405).  Polanyi thus closes PK with an outburst of 
religious sentiments that parallels Darwin’s final words in the Origin of 
Species. And my question is-- Is this Polanyi’s prophetic faith or his religious 
folly?   
How I began this project 
I began this project because I was vaguely aware that Marjorie Grene, a 
professional philosopher with a special interest in modern biology, was very 
critical of Polanyi’s final chapter.  Phil Mullins has admirably traced how, from 
1952 to 1958, Marjorie Grene worked closely with Polanyi as he labored during 
six years to revise his Gifford Lectures for publication.  Mullins tells us: 
She [Grene] reports that she was “delighted” to join in Polanyi’s struggle 
to do what he called “‘articulate the inarticulate’” and that one of her first 
tasks in working with Polanyi was to find for Polanyi in the literature of 
biology “heresies in evolutionary theory, specifically critics of the 
evolutionary synthesis.” 2 (Mullins: 2). 
In her letter to J.H. Oldham, dated 12 May 1958, Grene thanks Oldham for his 
criticism of the final chapter sent to Polanyi a year earlier and suggests that, 
thanks to their combined support, Polanyi did “do it over--and . . . achieved 
absolutely the right finale.” 3   
This euphoria, however, did not persist.  Although always an advocate and 
capable interpreter of Polanyi, Grene in her later years expressed how 
unprepared both she and Polanyi were to interpret evolutionary theory in 1958 
and how she had, over the years, “grown more skeptical about cosmologies of 
emergence in any form.”4  Having recently read Richard Dawkins, The God 
                                       
2 PT, 91. 
3 Grene letter to Oldham, May 12, 1958. 10.4. Oldham Archive, Edinburgh University Library.   
4 “TK,” 168. 
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Delusion (2006), I now believe that I understand better why materialistic 
geneticists would be prone to entirely dismiss Polanyi’s final chapters as poorly 
informed about the power and beauty of neo-Darwinism.  Even Polanyi, at one 
point, remarks that the field theories that he appeals to are “finalistic” and 
bound to be rejected by biologists such as Dawkins because they impute to 
living organisms “magical powers which could explain anything—and hence 
explain nothing” (PK:399).  This, by the way, is the principal reason that both 
Polanyi and Dawkins systematically refuse to appeal to any form of divine 
intervention when talking about evolutionary development. 
My paper is divided into three parts.  In the first two parts, I intend to 
briefly explore three things Polanyi got wrong followed by three things 
that Polanyi got right.  In the final section, I will show how some sectors of 
contemporary microbiology are finding mechanism that guide evolutionary 
development—just as Polanyi expected they would.  Despite limitations, 
therefore, I shall conclude that Polanyi’s surmise that there are 
philogenetic forces guiding evolution has the prospect of being embraced 
by modern science.  
Where Polanyi Got Things Wrong 
 
1.  Man as the evolutionary apex– Polanyi takes for granted that biological  
evolution has come to it’s pinnacle in  “man” as “the most precious fruit of 
creation” (PK:385, SM;86). This entails a very short-sighted and self-serving view 
of creation.  Are not dolphins and eagles and cockroaches “most precious” in 
their own right and “more fitted for survival” in their own ecological niches?  
And by what accounting can “man” be regarded as “most precious” when, in 
such a short period of time, his species has recklessly destroyed the natural 
habitat and hunted nearly to extinction hundreds of species (bison, wolves, 
whales)?  Is it even possible that man’s industrial waste will soon bring a 
permanent death to the evolutionary chain of life as we know it on the planet 
earth?  
In fairness to Polanyi, he wrote at a time in which “man” referred to “humans, 
male and female,” when the evolutionary superiority of humans gave them the 
right to use, abuse, and destroy “lesser being,” and when the ecology of the 
planet was imagined to be immune to the cumulative waste products of 
industrial production. 
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2. Heuristic and morphogenetic fields-- Polanyi surmises that morphogenetic 
fields guiding embryologic development find their parallels in the heuristic 
fields guiding the advancement of knowledge.  Walter Gulick rightly faults 
Polanyi here for confusing apples and oranges: “Are there not significant 
differences in kind between the processes whereby a) an individual makes a 
discovery, b) a growing individual matures, and c) a species evolves?”5, Gulick 
rightly asks. 
Polanyi, for one brief moment, admits that “heuristic fields” cannot be “taken 
literally . . . since it once more describes the movement of the mind as a 
passive event” (PK:403).  I would further add that this analogy fails because “the 
lines of force in a heuristic field” invariable suggests that independent minds 
would be prone to undertake the same investigations and to move towards the 
same conclusions.6  While there is some research into independent 
investigators coming to claim overlapping discoveries, no one expects that 
some independent “heuristic field” needs to be postulated to account for such 
simultaneous discoveries.7  Finally, the very proposition that the progress of 
thought follows a causal impulse that stands outside of and independent of the 
human organism is a violation of everything that has been hitherto proposed in 
PK.   
Going further, the notion of a “heuristic field” serves to obscure the risk, the 
individuality, and the aptitude for error that shrouds every pioneering venture.   
Grene laments this early formulation8 because it slips into “ontological 
dogmatism”—a tendency that she finds corrected by the time he arrives at TD. 
Polanyi adapted the notion of morphogenetic fields9 since   this language 
became popular in the 1920s and peaked in the 1950s when Polanyi was 
exploring his dissatisfaction with neo-Darwinism.  Field theory was adapted by 
biologists from physics as a way of accounting  for the orderly development of 
                                       
5 Walter B. Gulick, POLANYI ON TELEOLOGY: A RESPONSE TO APCZYNSKI AND GELWICK, Zygon 
40/1 (March 2005) 93. 
6 The same can be said when Polanyi wants to apply field theory to the phylogenetic changes 
that accompany evolutionary development—evolution never follows one route in all times and 
in all places. 
7 Thomas Kuhn is much more on the mark here when he postulates that the persistence of 
anomalies within a shared field of endeavor leads independent investigators to adapt parallel 
strategies for resolving the problem at hand.  
8 Grene in 1991 said she rejected the ontology of Polanyi in the final chapter because it 
undercut the precarious nature of commitment.  A heuristic field trumps epistemological 
vulnerability just as a cosmic field trumps evolutionary and ecological vulnerability. 
9  See overview under “morphogenetic field” in Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morphogenetic_field). 
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hundred of thousands of individual cells that subdivided from the original 
fertilized ovum and progressively took on differentiated forms in accordance 
with whether it was fashioning bone tissue or the eye or the nervous system.  In 
the period when Polanyi wrote PK, “The basic paradigm of embryology, the idea that gave it 
structure and coherence, was the morphogenetic field” 10  Moreover, Paul Weiss, whom Polanyi cites 
in his text (PK:357), must have appealed to Polanyi because of his experimental realism: 
"The field concept is not only a useful circumlocution, but an expression of physical reality." 
This elevated the field to "the dignity of an object of research," and it imposed a duty to 
study it just as one would study any newly discovered natural phenomenon.11
With the discovery of the double helix by James Watson & Francis Crick in 1953, 
interest in morphogenetic fields gradually waned.  Since then, the assumption 
has been that the master blueprint for embryonic development lies entirely 
embedded in the “genetic code.”  As a result, interest in Paul Weiss’ 
morphogenetic fields fell into abeyance and those dedicated to investigating it 
were often unable to publish their findings.12  In the 90s, however, field theory 
reemerged in molecular biology and today it forms a common mode whereby 
phylogenesis in evolution can be integrated with morphogenesis in 
embryiology.  It should be recognized, however, that Polanyi’s use of 
“morphogenetic fields” is significantly different from what finds in modern 
molecular biology.13  In the end, we are left with strong reasons for lamenting 
Polanyi’s use of field theory to link development in science with development in 
biology. 
3. Postulating a cosmic field – In the final pages of PK, Polanyi draws a parallel 
between the long and hazardous route whereby evolutionary development led 
to the achievement of human consciousness and the equally long and 
hazardous route whereby societies of individuals achieved a growing body of 
knowledge to which all were committed (PK:380).   In the end, Polanyi seems to 
be saying that every contribution to this joint achievement of biogenetic and 
noogenetic14 evolution (even those who followed lines of development that are 
10 Scott F. Gilbert, “The "Re-discovery" of Morphogenic Fields”  DevBio: a companion to Developmental 
Biology, 8th ed.(Sinauer Associates, 2006) (http://8e.devbio.com/article.php?ch=3&id=18) 1. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Morphogenetic fields are used in embryology to account for how a cluster of undifferentiated 
embryonic cells progressively fashion a heart while others fashion a nervous system.  In Polanyi, 
morphogenetic fields, as far as I can tell, are never used in this perspective; rather, they are 
appealed to by way of accounting for how embryonic development is guided from beginning to 
end just as was the million years of evolutionary development which it encapsulates.   
14 Polanyi explicitly names Teilhard de Chardin as describing how, at the ultimate evolutionary 
step, “human knowledge was born, noogenesis” (PK:388). Thus it would appear that Polanyi was 
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now extinct) ought to be reckoned as defeating the meaninglessness of our 
short, transient lives that return to the dust out of which they emerged.  Then 
his closing lines: 
We may envisage then a cosmic field which called forth all these centers 
by offering them a short-lived, limited, hazardous opportunity for making 
some progress of their own toward an unthinkable consummation.    And 
this is also, I believe, how a Christian is placed when worshipping God 
(PK:405). 
I do not believe for one moment that Polanyi was affirming the efficacy of 
prayers to bring the needed rains or to withhold them on the occasion of a 
church picnic.  Nor do I find evidence that Polanyi believed in a God who 
continually guided evolution and brought it to its Omega Point.  With even 
greater force, I do not imagine that Polanyi thought of Jesus as divinely 
revealing God’s plan for redemption.  Rather, I find that Polanyi rejected both 
materialistic determinism and supernatural interventionism altogether.  Polanyi, 
in one telling section, asks:  
Were all the works of the human mind already inscribed invisibly in the 
configuration of primeval incandescent gases?  Or must, alternatively, 
each new discovery of man be ascribed to a new divine intervention? 
(PK:395) 
To both of these options, Polanyi responds with a definitive “no” (PK:404).  This 
is a telling admission.  Polanyi has been sometimes portrayed as borrowing 
from Augustine.  It must be remembered, however, that Augustine required 
divine intervention every time someone came to recognize the “truth” of an 
abstract formulation (even if it was just a mathematical theorem).  Polanyi, in 
contrast, never appeals to God as prompting, guiding, or confirming the 
discovery process. 
 
confirmed in his association of biogenetic and noogenetic evolution by Le Phenomene Humain 
(citing the French title first published in 1955 that did not get translated into English until 
1959, a year after the publication of PK).  Teilhard wrote: “Our century is probably more 
religious than any other. How could it fail to be, with such problems to be solved? The only 
trouble is that it has not yet found a God it can adore.”  Polanyi would have agreed with the last 
sentence and the last sentence in his book represents his attempt to resolves Teilhard’s 
problem. 
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When it comes to the emergence of life on earth (PK: 394-395) or the 
emergence of humans within a colony of primates, Polanyi fully accepted the 
naturalistic commitment of a scientist and denied divine intervention: 
We shall say . . . that the rise of man includes a continuous intensification 
of individuality, similar to what takes place in the formation of the human 
person from the parental zygote.  No new creative agent, therefore, need 
be said to enter an emergent system as consecutive new stages of being 
(PK:395). 
The  “cosmic field” that Polanyi embraces in PK  is consequently not the “God of 
the gaps” that makes certain that the evolutionary thrust achieves its final goal.  
Nor does this field refer to the “God of the Deists” who sets the universe in 
motion but then quickly retires to a non-interventionist stance.  Even in the 
heuristic domain, Polanyi never entertains the notion that God has to step in 
and to guide his/her devoted servants in their quest for truth.15  Rather, Polanyi 
uses the term “cosmic field” as the unexplicated and unsuspected lure for 
transcendence that is found in both morpogenetic and noogenetic activity.16 
This will become clearer in what follows. 
Having reviewed two soft spots in Polanyi, I pass on to two areas where Polanyi 
got things right. 
Where Polanyi Got Things Right 
 
1. Random mutations cannot account for progress 
Ac cording to neo-Darwinism, the mechanism for upward biological evolution is 
random mutations and natural selection.  In most instances, DNA molecules are 
replicated flawlessly.  There are times, however, when mutations are 
introduced.  A virus might attack and alter a gene.  A high-velocity particle (for 
outer space or natural radioactivity of the earth) might smash into the double 
15 Augustine believed that the unaided human powers could not distinguish truth from error; 
hence, a divine inspiration was necessary to confirm the truth of every discovery, whether made 
in the field of theology or the field of mathematics.   
16 This “cosmic field” was not just a passing fancy for, again, in the Study of Man,16 Polanyi refers 
to our “cosmic calling” (97) by way of summarizing what he had presented in PK.  In TD, 
published some eight years later, Polanyi refers only to the “cosmic emergence of meaning” 
within both morpogenetic and noogenetic activity. 
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helix.  Or a chance error might take place in the replication process that is 
promoted by chemicals such as xxx.  The vast majority of such mutations are 
so destructive that they result in sterility.  When conception does take place, it 
gives rise to developmental malformations that are either spontaneously 
aborted or born grotesquely deformed (and hardly fit for survival).   
According to neo-Darwinism, however, chance mutations sometimes produce a 
small biological improvement (better hearing, faster running, more immunity to 
disease).   In these cases, the offspring outperforms other hatchlings, gains 
some small ascendency within its given environment, and lives to pass it 
advantage on in sexual reproduction.  Within a series of successive generations, 
the improved gene offers a superior survival rate and more frequently gets 
passed on during the mating season.  Over time, a large portion of the 
offspring incorporates the advantages of the beneficial mutation. Consequently, 
a small step has been made in preparation for the forward march of evolution. 
Polanyi finds difficulty in imagining how random mutations could produce any 
advantage whatsoever. To defend his position, he suggests the thought 
experiment whereby a monkey was allowed to make changes in a text of 
“Romeo and Juliet” on a keyboard.  Only degradation would result, and the 
greater the degree of blind chance, the greater the degradation.  Polanyi could 
also have appealed to the thousands of experiments performed on fruit flies 
whereby mutations were induced by exposure to low level doses of x-rays.  The 
offspring from such radiation experiments are littered with still-births and 
deformities. Among those that survive into adulthood, not a single instance of 
biological improvement has ever been identified. 
Let’s suppose that Polanyi had the opportunity to talk with Richard Dawkins.  
Not only is Dawkins the best known and most highly respected public defender 
of neo-Darwinism, he is one of those rare scientists who openly defies any 
theologian who tries to insert some hidden influence of God within the 
evolutionary process.  Dawkins openly admits that his commitment to Darwin 
demolished his early faith in God, and he is not ashamed to be regarded as 
“Darwin’s Rottweiler.”17 Dawkins puts heavy stock in what natural marvels are 
possible when random mutations functioning in tandem with survival of the 
fittest perfect organisms over millions of years. 
17 It was Dawkin’s colleague at Oxford, the theologian Alister McGrath, who first identified 
Dawkins as "Darwin's Rottweiler." The label has stuck because Dawkins plays the part so well. 
10 
 
Dawkins acknowledges that religious folk habitually use Genesis to imagine 
that God created our earth in just the right place such that it would be 
hospitable to life.  For Dawkins, however, no such surmise is necessary or 
advantageous.  “People of a theological bent,” Dawkins notes, “are often 
chronically incapable of distinguishing what is true from what they’d like to be 
true.” (Dawkins:135).  Those who wrote Genesis, moreover, had not the vaguest 
notion of how old and how big the universe actually was.  This is the opening 
that Dawkins has been waiting for: 
It has been estimated that there are between 1 billion and thirty billion 
planets in our galaxy, and about 100 billion galaxies in the universe 
(165). 
Most planets, of course, are too hot or too cold to support life.  Taking a 
conservative figure, and surmising that only one out of a hundred planets has a 
stable elliptical orbit in the “Goldilocks zone” wherein liquid water is present 
(and not just steam or ice).  This means that only as few as a million planets in 
our galaxy could support life.  With a 100 billion galaxies in our known 
universe, however, this allows us to compute that “a billion billion is a 
conservative estimate of the number of available” (165).   
Now suppose the origin of life, the spontaneous arising of something 
equivalent to DNA, really was a quite staggeringly improbable event.  
Suppose that it was so improbable as to occur on only one in a billion 
[suitable] planets. . . .  And, yet . . . even with such absurdly long odds, 
life will still have arisen on a billion planets—of which earth, of course, in 
one. (165). 
Once some primitive form of DNA emerges, however, we may have little more 
than a bacteria.   
The origins of the eukaryotic cell (our kind of cell, with a nucleus and 
various other complicated features . . .) was even a more momentous, 
difficult and statistically improbable step than the origin of life.  The 
origin of consciousness might be another major gap which bridging was 
of the same order of improbability. (168) 
So, let’s say that only one out of a million life bearing planets emerge with the 
cell.  Once cells are in the making, however, now statistics fall away.  Now 
survival of the fittest comes into play and this “natural selection works because 
it is a cumulative one-way street to improvement” (169). 
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At this point, Polanyi would politely interrupt.  In every sexual coupling, he 
would explain, two sets of genetic  traits are mixed, and the genetic traits of 
the offspring follow Mendelssohn’s laws.  Over thousands of years, the various 
finches found on the various separated islands visited by Darwin take on 
distinct and stable variations akin to the genetic traits that separate the 
Japanese from the African from the European human.  In all of these instances, 
however, one has a stable system that moves within the confines of the total 
diversity of genetic traits with which one begins.   
The genetic variations necessary to account for upward evolutions however go 
way beyond genetic reshuffling.  In the laboratory, thousand of experiments 
have bombarded fruit flies with x-rays.  Too much x-rays renders the entire 
sample sterile.  Too little x-rays have no effect at all.  When just the right dose 
is applied, all sorts of variations appear in the offspring.  In each instance, the 
variations are destructive.  One fly has only one wing and cannot fly at all.  
Another has wings of two different sizes and can only fly in circles.  Others have 
visual deformities.  Others cannot walk because they have too few legs or that 
their legs are attached to the body in such a way that the six feet cannot reach 
the ground simultaneously.  Why is this, Polanyi wants to know. 
Dawkins admits that mutations are inherently random, and that they are far 
more likely to damage the organism rather than improve it. In fact, he says, 
only very rarely does one expect a positive mutation and, here and only here is 
“ultimately why evolution by natural selection is possible at all."  
Now Polanyi weighs in.  Mutations are random events.  Such random events are 
caused by inherently destructive forces.  They are destructive to the extent 
required to disrupt the stable genetic code but not so destructive as to make it 
sterile—a way of saying “destroyed beyond recognition.”  Effectively, a 
constructive result is being anticipated from a blindly destructive force.  
2. That the Universe is Designed for Life 
Polanyi would allow that the recent speculation concerning the “anthropic 
principle” demonstrates that the five fundamental constants of physics are 
“fine-tuned” to support life.  This does not mean that astro-physicists and 
cosmologists have proven that the physical constants in our current universe 
have produced life; rather, they suggest, negatively, that had any of the 
fundamental constants been much higher or lower, life would have been 
impossible anywhere in this universe.   
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Dawkins has no difficulty with the “anthropic principle” unless, of course, it is 
being used to suggest that there is some hidden design or Designer behind 
what is.  To diffuse this, Dawkins takes the speculation of cosmologists to 
another level.  Let’s suppose, he suggests that in alternative universes that the 
physical constants could be and indeed are different from those within our own 
universe. Then, suppose further that what astro-physicists are speculating 
about an unending string of universes being fashioned by virtue of our present 
universe expanding to the point that universal gravitational brings this 
expansion to a halt and reverses it such that the universe is not contracting.  
Eventually, the entirety of the universe would be concentrated at the very center 
and set off a new Big Bang, fashioning universe #2.  This expansion-contraction 
cycle of approximately 20 billion earth-years could repeat itself during an 
infinity of time.  Thus, random variations of the physical constants could be 
tried.  Eventually, no matter how improbable, the constants would be aligned in 
the way that we know them to be.  The fact that we are here to witness it is a 
testimony to the particular random characteristics of this universe.  In the 
billions upon billions of failures, there would be no conscious life to even notice 
that life did not take hold.  Hence, in our own case, the fine-tuning of our own 
universe says nothing about design.  We are just caught up in a happy accident 
(which has no explanation beyond probabilities). 
Paul Davies, in his book The Goldilocks Enigma (2006)18, suggests that one 
explanation of the “anthropic principle” is that “an intelligent Creator designed 
the Universe specifically to support complexity and the emergence of 
Intelligence.” Christian Fundamentalist, needless to say, entirely endorse such a 
position because they are overjoyed when a prominent scientist allows that 
Intelligent Design can be acknowledged as one possible explanation of 
evolution.  
Dawkins will have none of this.19  For him, “the persuasive illusion of design” 
has no more place in biology than in cosmology.  While Dawkins admits that 
some scientists do claim to be committed believers, he judges that they do a 
disservice to science when they mistakenly allow themselves or their co-
religionists to imagine that there are supernatural forces at play in the cosmos 
in addition to the orderly natural principles.  Or, if they make a choice for God, 
18 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropic_principle 
19 Polanyi, needless to say, would support Dawkins at this point but not for the reasons that 
Dawkins puts forward.  Polanyi’s objections will be taken up in the conclusion of this essay. 
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Dawkins asks them to decide “which God”20—Yahweh, Baal, the Trinity, Allah, 
Vishnu.  Even if they make a choice for a God that “constantly keeps a finger on 
each and every particle [in the universe],” as Richard Swinbourne21 claims, does 
this not make God redundant as soon as it is discovered that the natural forces 
inherent in the universe are doing exactly the same thing.  In fact, given the 
evidence in the Scriptures that God is notoriously unreliable--given to fits of 
jealousy against rivals, of anger against sinners, and of blessing for the chosen 
few—wouldn’t it be more intellectually satisfying and emotionally appealing to 
trust that invariant natural forces are in charge and that God is nowhere and at 
no time depended upon “to keep a finger on things.”22
In sum, even if one allows that the genetic code does entirely encode all the 
operations of a living organism, Polanyi would affirm that random mutations of 
that code can never produce any movement toward a different and improved 
set of organismic principles.    As a result, Polanyi believes that one is required 
to surmise that the long and gradual ascent of evolution depends upon the 
“action of the ordering principle underlying such a persistent creative trend” 
that is “necessarily overlooked or denied by the theory of natural selection” 
(PK:385).  Once recognized, this would “reduce mutation and selection to their 
proper status of merely releasing and sustaining the action of evolutionary 
principles by which all major evolutionary achievements are defined” (PK:385).  
In effect, therefore, Polanyi embraces all the observations and conclusions of 
Darwin23 but then adds that an ordering principle (hitherto unsuspected) must 
operate to guide the process along its course. 
To understand this “ordering principle,” Polanyi appeals to the process of 
intellectual advancement within a community of seekers who share the same 
tradition.  To this our attention must now turn. 
                                       
20 Dawkins, Delusion, 133-135. 
21 Richard Swinburne gave the Gifford lectures at Aberdeen from 1982 to 1984, resulting in the 
book The Evolution of the Soul. From 1985 until his retirement in 2002 he was Nolloth Professor 
of the Philosophy of the Christian Religion at the University of Oxford. 
22 Ibid., 177. 
23 Polanyi allows that wing colorations in moths have natural variations and that, in a given 
environment, a black moth could have a definite survival advantage over the white moth.  This 
occurs, for example, when moths inhabit forests following fires and the light-colored moths get 
easily eaten by birds when they alight on blackened barks.  For this to take place, however, the 
genetic laws of Mendelssohn suffice and no genetic mutations are necessary. 
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2. The link between noogenesis and phylogenesis revisited 
At first sight, Polanyi seems to slip into a dead end.  Normally the very complex 
is accounted for in terms of a less complex process that is better understood.  
Not so in this case.  The experience of indwelling in a problem and gradually 
finding a secure way toward a novel solution is at the heart of Polanyi’s 
epistemology.  Today, many others have joined Polanyi in accepting that tacit 
powers are released in the deliberate straining over a problem that gradual 
yield a sense of approaching a solution. 
As Polanyi put it: "We must conclude that the paradigmatic case of 
scientific knowledge, in which all faculties that are necessary for finding 
and holding scientific knowledge are fully developed, is the knowledge of 
an approaching discovery" (TD 24-25). Indeed, many scientists have 
acknowledged relying on such anticipatory hunches in pursuing their 
scientific ideas. As the Nobel Laureate in medicine Michael Brown 
observed: "As we did our work, we felt at times that there was almost a 
hand guiding us. Because we would go from one step to the next, and 
somehow we would know which was the right way to go. And I really can't 
tell how we knew that" (cited in Claxton, 1998:57). The Nobel Laureate 
Stanley Cohen similarly commented on the importance of developing a 
"nose" for anticipating promising directions, noting "I am not always 
right, but I do have feelings about what is an important observation and 
what is probably trivial" (cited in Claxton, 1998:57).24
Without removing my earlier reservations regarding the misuse of field theory 
to apply to the problem, I do submit that Polanyi was absolutely right in so far 
as he eliminated “randomness” as the front runner in the advancement of ideas 
and the advancement of species.  Polanyi, of course, never appealed to a god of 
the gaps to account for how a researcher comes to a satisfactory solution or 
how a break in the genetic code yields to a phylogenetic principle.  The tacit 
powers of the knower and the inherent powers of the organism are where the 
solution is to be found.  The solution, in both cases, is close at hand and not far 
away. 
24 Jonathan W. Schooler and Sonya Dougal, Why Creativity is Not like the Proverbial Typing 
Monkey, Psychological Inquiry 10/4 ( 1999) 351. 
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3. Hierarchies and boundary control 
Another way that Polanyi opposes neo-Darwinism is by insisting that biological 
principles cannot be reduced to or derived from chemical principles.  The 
chemistry that goes on in a sick or dead organism is just a valid (as far as 
chemical principles are concerned) as that going on in a living organism. 
Polanyi illustrates this as follows: 
A floating amoeba emits exploratory pseudopodia in all directions, which 
will catch food or else attach themselves to solid ground and then drag 
the whole mass of protoplasm . . . toward this foothold.  All these 
maneuvers are coordinated: the amoeba hunts for food.  Thus it grows 
fatter. . . (PK:387). 
Polanyi has no intention of affirming a self-consciousness in amoebae; however, 
he does want to affirm that a living cell has “a stamp of individuality” and “a 
center of self-interest” that asserts itself against “the world-wide drift of 
meaningless [chemical and physical] happenings” (PK:387).  Detecting and 
ingesting what is suitable as “food” is a self-serving and self-interested activity.  
Chemistry can say nothing about being hungry or being sated.  Not to allow for 
such purposeful language is to entirely lose our ability to describe and compare 
living things altogether. Moreover:  
Lower levels bear on higher levels insofar as they “define the conditions of 
their success and account for their failures, but they cannot account for 
their success, for they cannot even define it” (PK, 382).   
Polanyi sometime speaks of “emergence” of new principles.  This takes place in 
the development of an embryo in so far as new organic systems (a circulatory 
system, a nervous system, an antiviral system) emerge that follow complex 
organic principles that were not previously present.  Polanyi draws an analogy 
with this morphogenesis and the phylogenesis evident in evolutionary 
development.  Polanyi himself used this term “emergence” hesitatingly because 
it could be construed as an appeal to “magical powers which could explain 
anything—and hence explain nothing” (PK:399). 
Paul Davies arrives at a position remarkably parallel to Polanyi.  Instead of 
appealing to “emerging” properties or principles, he refers to a “sequence of 
self-organizing processes.”  This presents an option from complexity theory 
that might have given Polanyi a better hearing.  Consider the following: 
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The physical world is not arbitrarily regulated; it is ordered in a very 
particular way, poised between the twin extremes of simple regimented 
orderliness and random complexity: it is neither a crystal nor a random 
gas. The universe is undeniably complex, but its complexity is of an 
organized variety. Moreover, this organization was not built into the 
universe at its origin. It has emerged from primeval chaos in a sequence 
of self-organizing processes that have progressively enriched and 
complexified the evolving universe in a more or less unidirectional 
matter. It is easy to imagine a world that, while ordered, nevertheless 
does not possess the right sort of forces or conditions for the emergence 
of complex organization." 8
 The attempts on the part of reductionists to reduce even human thoughts and 
strivings to chemical reactions and synaptic impulses in the brain are entirely 
ludicrous.  Polanyi explains: 
We speak of the thoughts Shakespeare had while writing his plays and 
not the thoughts of hydrochloric acid dissolving zinc, because men think 
and acids don’t. . . .  And so long as we can form no idea of the way a 
material system may become a conscious, responsible person, it is an 
empty pretence to suggest that we have an explanation for the descent of 
man (PK:389-390). 
John C. Walton explained the growing dissatisfaction with reductionism in 1977 
in the following terms: 
Some of the most eminent and influential theoreticians such as 
Schrödinger, Wigner, Polanyi and Longuet-Higgins have suggested that 
we cannot understand the origin and stability of biological structures in 
terms of the presently known laws of physics. . . .   Living matter is 
distinguished from inanimate matter by its organization, function, 
purpose, adaptability etc., but these concepts are foreign in the physical 
sciences.25
                                       
25 John C. Walton, “ORGANIZATION AND THE ORIGIN OF LIFE,” Origins 4(1):16-35 (1977).  
www.grisda.org/origins/04016.htm 
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During the last twenty years, a significant number of b
have joined a research program known as evolutionary 
ology.  Insiders have abbreviated this to “evo-devo” a
term now appears regularly in the journals and grant proposals.26  Foremo
among the big names associated with this movement is Wallace Arthur, 
professor of zoology and head of the zoology department at the National 
University of Ireland, Galway.  
[[[Click here to view a three-minute video: Sean B. Carroll discusses the science of evolution and the 
field of evo-devo.]]]
 Evo-devo specialists are keen to explore DNA, not as a blueprint for the 
arrangement of parts, but as a complex toolkit27 that determines the orderly 
development of the embryo.  Anyone familiar with pictures of the human 
embryo taken every three weeks will immediately notice that the embryo at six 
weeks looks more like a fish than a human. Meanwhile, the “embryonic toolkit” 
within the DNA seems to be remarkably similar whether one is looking at the 
sequence in humans, fish, or fruit flies.  In the case of humans, the miniature 
heart is beating in the third week even though the circulatory system has only 
begun to take shape.  Furthermore, the growth of the beating heart proceeds in 
order to keep pace with the increased blood flow required by an expanding 
circulatory system that is routed throughout all the individual organs, muscles, 
and skin layers.  Once the circulatory system is completed, heart growth is 
switched off.  Meanwhile, the nervous system is being networked through all 
the muscles (including the heart muscle); yet, the nerve endings are not 
connected together inside the cortex until late in the fifth month of fetal 
                                       
26 Elizabeth Pennisi, “EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY: Evo-Devo Enthusiasts Get Down to Details” 
Science 298/5595 (1 November 2002) 953 – 955. 
27 “The developmental-genetic toolkit consists of genes whose products control the 
development of a multicellular organism. Differences in deployment of toolkit genes affect the 
body plan and the number, identity, and pattern of body parts. The toolkit is highly conserved 
across animal phyla. Only a small fraction of the genes in the genome are involved in 
development. The majority of toolkit genes are components of signaling pathways, and encode 
for the production of transcription factors, cell adhesion proteins, cell surface receptor proteins, 
and secreted morphogens. Their function is highly correlated with their spatial and temporal 
expression patterns. One of the major goals of evo-devo is to catalogue all genes (their identity, 
product, function, and interaction) in the toolkit” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Evolutionary_developmental_biology#The_developmental-genetic_toolkit). 
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development.  Thus, in brief, the DNA provides a unified game plan whereby 
organismic processes are turned on and off as individual cells are differentiated 
and begin performing their particular tasks in the overall production that is 
under way. 
DNA decoding has demonstrated that every gene has a large amount of “junk” 
built into it that was picked up during its evolutionary past but remains 
“switched off.”  The human genome, for example, has the duplicate of a yeast 
DNA within its junk code.  Furthermore, research demonstrates that the DNA 
helix is more vulnerable to mutations in some segments more than in others.  
Lastly, some environmental factors can turn on embryonic processes that would 
otherwise remain dormant.  In sum, embryonic development is filled with 
“biases” favoring certain lines of mutations while impeding others.28  This then 
is the archway that Wallace Arthur uses to join the dual pillars of random 
mutations and survival of the fittest.29 In sum, evo-devo intends to revise 
Darwin as follows: 
All biologists agree that natural selection can only work when there is variation for it to use. Yet 
the supply of variation has been much less investigated by evolutionists than the selective 
process that acts upon it. The variation is not random, as is sometimes claimed. Rather, it is 
structured in various ways, at both genetic and embryological levels.30
Evo-devo thus provides one possible interpretation for the morphogenetic fields 
that Polanyi spoke of as guiding embryonic and evolutionary development.   
This branch of biology has the advantage that it is looking at organisms as 
living systems and not reducing life to biochemical reactions.  It also 
incorporates Polanyi’s intuition that embryonic development is intimately 
connected with evolutionary development.  Finally, it is revealing the hidden 
causes for an orderly development which cannot be found in chance events.  
Once again, Polanyi is vindicated when he surmised that chance events could 
release the ordered mechanisms that guided evolution but it could never 
account for them as such. 
                                       
28 Beth A. Montelone, Ph. D., Mutation, Mutagens, and DNA Repair (1998); originally written as a supplement to 
BIOL400, Human Genetics. www-personal.k-state.edu/~bethmont/mutdes.html 
29 Wallace Arthur, Biased Embryos and Evolution (Cambridge: University Press,  2004) 
30 Wallace Arthur, Creatures of Accident (Farrar Straus & Giroux, 2006) cited on 
www.creaturesofaccident.com/contents.htm. Also: “Experimental evidence exists that in some 
instances the rate of specific mutations arising is greater when they are advantageous to the 
organism than when they are not,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutation 
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Three Case Studies 
Case Study #1: Polanyi prophetic claims here have  been confirmed by recent 
genetic researchers such as Lev Yamolsky and Arlin Stolzfus (University of 
Maryland Biotechnology Institute) who have shown that “simple mutational 
biases” found within genes enable us to account for how “randomness is 
skewed” toward favorable outcomes.  
Case Study #2: Three papers, one in Science, one in Nature, and one in the 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Science (Colosimo et al., 2005; Shapiro 
et al., 2004; and Cresko et al., 2004) appeared in 2004 and 2005 showing that 
dramatic morphological changes have appeared independently in a number of 
populations of freshwater threespine sticklebacks that have all evolved since 
the end of the last glaciation (i.e., between 9,000 and 14,000 years ago). Some 
(perhaps even most) of these populations are thought to be new species.  
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“Had evolution been entirely dependent upon natural selection, from a 
bacterium only numerous forms of bacteria would have emerged.”31   
Case Study #3: Michael Ruse is Lucyle T. Werkmeister Professor of Philosophy, 
Florida State University.  In his latest book, Ruse shows how Darwin expelled 
design (of the kind dear to William Paley) from biology; however, he also shows 
how the design metaphor has strong emotional and intellectual resonance when 
biologists describe how certain functions of organism give them survival value. 
There is no reason to think that biology calls for special life forces over and 
above the usual processes of physics and chemistry. Nor is there reason to think 
that biology is little more than complicated physics and chemistry... There does 
seem to be something distinctive about biological understanding--something 
having to do with purposes and ends in evolution... We treat organisms--the 
parts at least--as if they were manufactured, as if they were designed, and then 
we try to work out their functions. End-directed thinking--teleological thinking-
-is appropriate in biology because, and only because, organisms seem as if they 
were manufactured, as if they had been created by an intelligence and put to 
work... Darwinism does not have design built in as a premise, but the design 
emerges as Darwinism does its work and some organisms get naturally selected 
over others. (p. 268-9)  
While Ruse agrees that the God hypothesis is out-of-place in science, he 
defends “the respectability of design in science and rescues it place in 
philosophy.”32
Conclusion 
 
Michael Heller, a priest and a physicist, describes the “moral choice” made by 
scientists—namely, “to search for answers concerning the world and  ourselves 
in terms of arguments and demonstrations, without looking for help ‘from 
outside.’ “33  Heller regards this “moral option” as tenable and noble, even while 
he recognizes it as hazardous and cloaked with the sense of mystery: 
                                       
31 Cited from the Japanese geneticist Susumu Ohno, Evolution by Gene Duplication, 1970. 
www.creaturesofaccident.com/centralidea.htm 
32 William S. Stone, “A Summary of Michael Ruse’s Darwin and Design,” Zygon 37/2 (2002) 446. 
33 Michael Heller, Creative Tension: Essays on Science and Religion (Philadelphia: Templeton 
Foundation Press, 2003) 161. 
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Only outsiders and mediocre scientists believe that in science everything 
is clear and obvious.  Every good scientist knows that he is dancing on 
the edge of a precipice between what is known and what is only feebly 
felt in just-formulated questions.34
Within the final chapters of PK, I consequently believe that the evolutionary 
question was not open, for Polanyi, to any easy affirmation of the God of the 
gaps.  Polanyi faulted neo-Darwinian theory because it was a defective scientific 
theory which concealed a process that Polanyi firmly believed stood behind the 
ascent of more complex forms culminating in the conscience awareness and 
commitments of humans.  This is significant, because, in no other scientific 
arena did Polanyi oppose a reigning theory due to his post-modernist 
philosophy.   
I would risk speaking for Polanyi in saying that a biologist settling for random 
mutations and survival of the fittest to explain the ascent of man was no better 
or worse than religious Fundamentalist insisting that God intervened to make it 
all possible.  In both the former (a scientific dogmatism linked to the genius of 
Darwin) and the later (a religious dogmatism linked to the divine inspiration of 
Genesis), their respective dogmatisms simply keep them from suspecting and 
exploring the nature of the mechanisms that stand poised to produce the feat 
of evolution. 
Given Polanyi’s moral choice for naturalism and given his relative ignorance of 
microbiology, Polanyi was not in a position to expose what he intuited was 
there.  He was even unable to define the programmatic research that would lead 
to the truth that he sought.  He borrowed the notion of field theory simply 
because it was a leading theory in his day for accounting for embryonic 
development.  In Polanyi’s mind, however, every embryonic development 
encapsulated the phylogenetic development that had been embedded in the 
genetic code over millions of years of evolutionary development.  And when it 
came to phylogenetic development, it was just as ridiculous to imagine that 
Nature rolls the dice and tries everything at random as to imagine that a 
scientist tries everything at random when pursuing a discovery.  Polanyi’s 
commitment to his  post-modernist philosophy of science, consequently, played 
a substantial role in setting him in opposition of neo-Darwinism. 
34 Ibid. 
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Polanyi states this more clearly while making free with the familiar lingo of 
Christianity: 
We cast off the limitations of objectivism in order to fulfill our calling. . . .  
Those who are satisfied by hoping that their intellectual commitments 
fulfill  their calling, will not find their hopes discouraged. . . .   
Commitment [to the process of free inquiry] offers those who accept it 
legitimate grounds for the affirmation of personal convictions with 
universal intent. . . .   
The stage on which we thus resume our full intellectual powers is 
borrowed from the Christian scheme of Fall and Redemption.  Fallen man 
is equated to the historically given and subjective condition of our mind, 
from which we may be saved by the grace of the spirit.  The technique of 
our redemption is to lose ourselves in the performance of an obligation 
which we accept, in spite of its appearing on reflection impossible of 
achievement.  We undertake the task of attaining the universal in spite of 
our admitted infirmity . . . because we hope to be visited by powers of 
which we cannot account in terms of our specifiable capabilities.  This 
hope is a clue to God, which I shall trace further in my last chapter. . . . 
(PK:324). 
Redemption is not achieved by a God entering the human condition and dying 
on the cross.  Nor is it achieved in a divine guidance that overwhelms those 
who humbly and persistently wait upon God as their redeemer.  Rather, the 
awaited “grace” is that of the intellectual passion “which strives to break 
through the accepted frameworks of thought, guided by the [tacit] intimations 
of discoveries still beyond our horizon” (PK:199).  The total devotion of a 
scientist pursuing a discovery is thus akin to the surrender of a Christian 
worshipping God (PK:198).  
I submit, therefore, that Polanyi took what was most familiar and dear to him, 
namely, the pursuit of discovery, and cloaked it in the sanctioned language of 
Christianity.  In effect, he is affirming his faith that every scientist like himself 
has known what Christians call “grace” and “redemption” through the self-
sacrificing pursuit of discovery.   For him, the “cosmic calling” is the “divine 
calling” and the “cosmic field” that urges us forward despite our seeming 
incapacity is the most profound religious act of worship that he can envision.  
In an act of poetic imagination, Polanyi cloaks the most arduous and hazardous 
pursuit of humans in religious language and thereby tacitly says to his 
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colleagues, “We have been to the top of the mountain.”  Christianity, mired as it 
is in “an absurd vision of the universe,” (TD:92) has little of consequence to 
offer us, but, be assured, meanwhile, that we are the true disciples that walk 
steadfastly in the way of  the cosmic calling that Christianity has so badly 
misunderstood.  
 
 
 
